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Contemporary Criticisms of Christian
Language
ROBERT T. OSBORN
THE question of language is a pri-mary issue for theology today. In-deed, in the broad sense that the-
ology is neither more nor less than the
continuing criticism and reassessment of the
language of the church, the question of lan-
guage is always the question. Today, how-
ever, the question is being raised in a spe-
cial way; there is a distinctive character to
the challenge. Even though theology is al-
ways given to an examination of certain key
words within the language of faith—such
words as Atonement and Holy Spirit—it is
not often that the language itself has been
questioned. But this is precisely the case at
the present time. Hence, the current question
is not, "What does the word 'Atonement'
mean?" but instead, "Is 'Atonement' a le-
gitimate word ?'
The purpose of this article is to assay a
large portion of the frontier where such
questions are being raised. This entails, of
course, the risk of oversimplification. In
identifying certain of the more formidable
critics within and without the Christian
church, together with their points of view, I
shall indicate briefly, wherever possible, their
alternative proposals.
Rudolf Bultmann
From within the church no one has dis-
puted its language so vigorously and effec-
tively as Rudolf Bultmann. His program is
so familiar that it need be sketched here only
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in its essential aspects. In his GifFord lec-
tures Bultmann acknowledges his debt to
Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Schleier-
macher, for both of whom the documents of
the past, including the Bible, were "firmly
established utterances of life."1 For Bult-
mann, the central core, the true subject of
history is man.2 Man is also the subject of
biblical history: "The question of God and
the question of myself are identical."8 Inso-
far as I, a student of past history, exist as
an authentic subject of my own present his-
tory, I have in my existence the key to the
past Hermeneutics must be existential. On
the one hand, I must know formally the
structure of human existence by means of ex-
istential analysis. Bultmann believes that
this is most adequately provided by Martin
Heidegger. On the other hand, if I am truly
to understand, I must be existential, filling
this formal structure with my own concrete
historical decisions in the "now" of responsi-
bility. In sum, to understand history, I must
be an existentialist and I must be existential.
And insofar as the Bible is history, it too
can be understood only through the language
of existence. Such language alone is able
both to ask the right questions of the Bible
and to declare the answer to modern man—
indeed, to men of all times.
By means of his method of Entmytholo-
gisierung (Demythologization), Bultmann
seeks to reduce the mythological language in
the Bible to the original and ideal language
of existence. It is important to bear in mind
that his purpose is a positive one. He wants
to put the biblical message into the proper
language so that its true message can be
heard and its offense reside where it ought
to reside, i.e., in the matter rather than the
form of Scripture. It is only in a secondary
and even accidental sense that demythologiz-
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ing may make Christianity more appealing
to modern man.
Bultmann rejects the language of myth but
unfortunately he does not make sufficiently
clear what he means by such language.4 At
one point he understands it as language set
within an ancient, non-scientific world-view.
Elsewhere myth becomes speaking about
God in worldly terms. However, in light of
Bultmann's positive program of translating
the gospel into the language of existence, the
view of myth with which he is most con-
cerned is one which locates the gospel mes-
sage in objective realities abstracted from
man as historical subject and hence available
without regard for man's existential relation-
ship to them.
In this way Bultmann challenges us to
speak in the language of existence. He
charges that the church has translated the
existential language of primitive Christianity
into the unnecessarily offensive language of
myth. Accordingly, he insists that the lan-
guage he proposes is not a new one; it is
simply the pristine language of the Bible.
Just as Bertrand Russell found in the calculus
of mathematics the key to all language, so
Bultmann finds in the calculus of existence
the key to all historical documents.
Karl Barth
Barth's critique of church language is no
less radical than Bultmann's. Perhaps be-
cause it is not as unique and certainly more
wordy it has failed to impress the church, at
least the church in America, as much as
Bultmann's. Nevertheless, as Roger Hazel-
ton has recently observed, "it was none other
than Karl Barth who wrote, back in 1936,
that the task of theology is to criticize and
revise language about God by the principle
of the standpoint peculiar to the Church."6
By reason of this principle—contrasting as
it does to that of Bultmann—Barth prefers
to call theology a science, "a human effort
after a definite object of knowledge" which
"follows a definite, self-consistent path of
knowledge" and is able to give an account of
itself both to itself and to anyone who walks
its path of knowledge.6 The peculiar prin-
ciple which judges the language of the
church and sets the goal of theology is Jesus
of Nazareth, the Word and Revelation of
God. The reality of Jesus is his reality as
the Word of God, and "the essence of this
person is identical with His language, action
and passion."7 This man of past history in
the objectivity of his words and deeds is the
Word of God. Barth's firmest statement of
this position is contained in his formulation
of the doctrine of election where he asserts
that "between God and man stands the per-
son of Jesus Christ, himself both God and
man and so the mediator between them
both."8 We must be careful not to misun-
derstand Barth at this point For him, it is
Jesus who stands eternally between God and
man. Commenting on the prologue of the
Gospel of John, Barth asserts that Jesus is
the meaning of the Logos. "He was in the
beginning with God: Jesus was in the be-
ginning with God." In fact, he goes as far
as to say, in agreement with Athanasius,
that "the preexisting God-man, Jesus Christ,"
is "the eternal ground of the divine elec-
tion."9 Barth thus maintains that it is
impossible for the Church to say "God" with-
out saying "Jesus of Nazareth." The objec-
tive history of Jesus, "his language, action
and passion," is the Word of God. Jesus is
the Word of God.
However, we must immediately add that
Jesus is the Word of God. God is the true
subject of biblical history, and ultimately, of
all history: The "history of the covenant
established by God, the gracious covenant
between him and man" is "theologically
speaking the history."10 History is not so
much the utterance of human life and the
word of man as it is the utterance of God's
life and word. Barth agrees with Bultmann
that objective events as such are silent. But
they are enabled to speak, according to
Barth, by means of a theological hermeneu-
tic. History's meaning is revealed as an
answer to theological questions and not to
existential questions. Barth also insists, as
does Bultmann, that the interpreter of Scrip-
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ture must be the right person as well as
have the right method. But where Bultmann
says that this person must have authentic
existence, Barth affirms that he must have
theological existence, existence in Christ.
The question we may ask of Barth is:
Where and how does one acquire a theologi-
cal hermeneutic and theological existence?
Barth answers—with Paul—"Jesus of Naz-
areth," "whom God has made our wisdom,"
who "is the image of the invisible God, the
first born of creation." Jesus, the incarnate
Son, as the object of the theological reflec-
tion of the church, provides the necessary
method, "the objective possibility of revela-
tion," while Jesus, the Holy Spirit, as the
subject of the theological life of the church,
provides the necessary existence, "the sub-
jective possibility of revelation." The goal
of the investigation of biblical history by the
man in Christ, aided as he is by Christologi-
cal analysis, is Jesus Christ, the objective
and subjective "reality of revelation."11
Thus, the primary goal is not, as Bultmann
would have it, "a certain possibility of ex-
istence."12
It is very significant that in one of the
latest volumes of the Kirchliche Dogmatik
Barth argues, against Bultmann and oth-
ers,18 that there was a pre-Easter revelation
in the actual events of Jesus' life—although,
to be sure, a provisional and conditional
revelation:
In retrospect, from the standpoint of resurrection
and ascension, in the light of this event, the deci-
sive revelatory event, the Christian community dis-
covered the anticipation of this event in the history
and existence of Jesus Christ himself and as such.
That is to say, the revelation had already occurred
objectively in the pre-Easter sequence of events.
. . . It is clear, not only with regard to the story
of the transfiguration but with regard to all the
other moments of the synoptic tradition, that it is
difficult to draw with any certainty the line between
the portion of the tradition which is shaped through
retrospection and the portion which is shaped by
direct memory. . . . His resurrection and ascen-
sion was and u nothing more than the authentic
communication and proclamation of the perfect
salvation deed, and indeed, the perfect salvation
word, which occurred once and for all in His pre-
ceding history and existence."
By calling attention to the pre-Easter "reve-
lation" Barth reminds us that he who is fully
revealed after Easter is the one who was be-
fore Easter. Jesus of Nazareth, then as now,
is the Word of God. God can and does
speak only in and through the life of Jesus.
Whereas Bultmann tends to reduce all re-
ligious language to the language of existence,
Barth tends to reduce all such language to
Christological language. The fundamental
issue here is that of language—not just
words, but language. Furthermore, the lan-
guages these two men propose are so dis-
parate that no reconciliation seems possible.
Perhaps both are subject to the criticism
that the later logical analysts were to make
of the earlier logical atomists and positivists:
Language should be judged according to its
actual use rather than through o priori no-
tions regarding its essential or deeper mean-
ing. In any case, here is a critical issue,
which leaves contemporary theology at an
impasse. Hermann Diem calls attention to
the seriousness of the situation:
This difference between Barth and Bultmann is
by no means limited to their conceptions of dog-
matics relative to Biblical theology; it extends to
the ultimate presuppositions of theological work as a
whole. Hence it would seem no longer possible to
find a common basis of discussion between them.
. . . It is consequently understandable that today a
mood of resignation prevails among theologians,
who see no further possibility of fruitful discussion,
with the inevitable result that each pursues his
lonely way. . . . u
The New Quest of the Historical Jesus
Is there a solution to the conflict between
Barth and Bultmann? In the introduction
to his New Quest of the Historical Jesus,
James Robinson refers to the "rapproche-
ment" between the "post-Bultmannians" and
Barth which is effected by this new quest.16
Giinther Bornkamm's Jesus of Nazareth is
an excellent example of the new develop-
ment It illustrates what appears to be a
movement from Bultmann to Barth and
may point the way to a resolution of the
controversy.
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Bornkamm makes dear his departure
from Bultmann when he says that his task
"is to seek the history in the kerygma of
the Gospels, and in this history to seek the
kerygma." The Gospels, he states, are con-
cerned with the pre-Easter history of Jesus.
"The Easter aspect in which the primitive
Church views the history of Jesus must cer-
tainly not be forgotten for one moment, but
not less the fact that it is precisely the his-
tory of Jesus before Good Friday and Easter
which is ever seen in this aspect" Then in
very Barthian fashion Bornkamm continues:
"To whatever extent mythological concep-
tions from time to time find access to the
thought and faith of the early Church, they
are given once and for all the function of in-
terpreting the history of Jesus as the history
of God with the world. As the language of
the New Testament puts it: the 'once' of
Jesus' history as God's 'once and for all/
certain to faith."17 For Bornkamm as for
Barth the basic language of the church is
the language of history, the language of the
history of Jesus.
Jesus, the figure of the past, is so impor-
tant to the church because the church "finds
its God and itself in the past, in which its
life and its character were given to it; and
in the future, in which its life and its charac-
ter are to be restored to i t" Jesus is so sig-
nificant because he is the Word of God, be-
cause he is a man of authority and mystery
who "transcends the merely historical
sphere." Yet his mystery and authority de-
note a reality which appertains to the histori-
cal Jesus, a reality not as yet subjected to
interpretation. Jesus is the Word of God.
Jesus of Nazareth is in his factuality the
eschatological event: "The story told by the
Gospels signifies the end of the world, al-
though not, it is true, in the sense of an ob-
vious drama and a visible catastrophe. On
the contrary, it is not the world which ends
here obviously and visibly; rather it is Jesus
of Nazareth on the cross. And yet, in this
story, the world reaches its end."18
Many more passages could be cited but
these suffice to indicate that Robinson is
right in perceiving a rapprochement with
Barth in the "new quest." The very fact that
Bornkamm's book is entitled Jesus of Naza-
reth, and not, for example, Jesus the Christ,
is itself highly significant How this devel-
opment may influence theology and the lan-
guage of the church and whether it will
actually succeed in bridging the gulf between
Barth and Bultmann remains to be seen.
Logical Analysis
It is appropriate to include in this survey
reference to an influential movement orig-
inating outside the church which has gained
a measure of support among theologians.
Logical or linguistic analysis refers to a
rather broad philosophical movement that
roots in Great Britain and primarily in the
thought of George Elmer Moore and Ber-
trand Russell. Moore was offended that
idealists could make statements which ap-
parently denied the obvious truisms of com-
mon sense—common sense assertions re-
garding especially the reality of the external
world. He therefore undertook "A Defence
of Common Sense" (1925) in which he
sought to analyze what he regarded as com-
mon sense truisms, and not to deny them.
For him, therefore, the business of philos-
ophy was clarification and not discovery,
meaning and not truth, language and not
fact. Bertrand Russell, troubled by the same
"nonsense" of metaphysicians, felt that the
reason otherwise intelligent people could talk
with such apparent disregard for empirical
reality was due to the limitations of everyday
language. As a mathematician he was im-
pressed with the precision of mathematical
logic, according to which all mathematical
propositions could be reduced to a few basic
propositions and truth functions of, or in-
ferences from, these basic propositions. He
tried to develop such an ideal language for
everyday usage in which the basic atomic
propositions would somehow correspond to
basic atomic facts, and all the atomic propo-
sitions, together with their truth functions,
would somehow correspond to the system of
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reality. This position, known as logical atom-
ism, was held by its proponents, particularly
Russell and Wittgenstein, without apparent
regard for its metaphysical nature.
A. J. Ayer, who was influenced by the
Vienna Circle of positivism, fed into this
British tradition a deepened distrust of meta-
physics and sought to develop as a substitute
the so-called "verification principle," accord-
ing to which a statement is meaningless if
it does not indicate a method for its em-
pirical verification. However, it was not
long before a fundamental inconsistency in
the verification principle came to be noted.
For on its very premises the statements of
the analysts and positivists about language
must be judged meaningless. Evidently,
Wittgenstein was the first to see this contra-
diction, and his own views were modified ac-
cordingly.19 He became convinced that phi-
losophy should rid itself of a priori notions
regarding an ideal language and the relation
of language to fact and concern itself only
with language as such, with its actual use.
John Wisdom, one of Wittgenstein's pu-
pils, publicized the latter's views and bears a
good measure of responsibility for the cur-
rent direction of British philosophy.20 Espe-
cially influential was Wisdom's article "Phil-
osophical Perplexity," which first appeared
in 1936. Philosophy, according to Wisdom,
is concerned with sentences which lack "a
conventional use," which cannot be em-
pirically verified. These sentences are an im-
plicit request to philosophy for "a verbal
recommendation," i.e., for a clarification
"not by explaining the peculiar nature of the
subject matter of the sentences . . . but by
reflection upon the peculiar manner in which
those sentences work."31
Friedrich Waismann wishes to "empha-
size that the idea of truth also varies with
the kind of statement; that it has a system-
atic ambiguity."22 Wisdom had noted differ-
ences in levels of meaning; Waismann
rightly perceives different strata of truth
also. In particular, insofar as his analysis
takes into account the situation of the man
who speaks, Waismann recognizes the sub-
jective or existential dimension of truth.
In the United States this existential di-
mension is the explicit concern of Willem
Zuurdeeg's Analytical Philosophy 0} Reli-
gion. Zuurdeeg*s point of view has been de-
scribed as "a treatment of religion on the
basis of the methods of empirical [analytical]
and existentialist philosophy."38 Generally
speaking, Zuurdeeg finds analytical philoso-
phy congenial because it lacks metaphysical
presumption and leaves room for the unique
language of religion. However, Carl Michal-
son objects that analytical philosophy says
too little, that the existential aspect is not
adequately developed and that it is a poor
dialogical partner for the theologian.24 He
would sympathize with a judgment cited
(but not accepted) by Antony Flew: that in-
sofar as philosophy is reduced to talk about
words it is trivial, that such philosophers
must "be selling their truthright for a mess
of verbiage" and that "they would be iden-
tified better as 'verbosophers.' "M
Obviously, linguistic philosophy cannot be
reduced to a single, consistent system. It is
not unfair, for example, to observe that "the
ghost of positivism" which Michalson dis-
cerns is not so visible in the later analytical
movement as in the earlier. On the other
hand, when Zuurdeeg turns to analytical phi-
losophy because of its theological congenial-
ity one must expect many of the linguistic
analysts to question the legitimacy of his en-
terprise. Surely, however, we cannot ignore
the challenge to analyze the perplexities of
theological language, neither can we ignore
the analytical tools proffered us by this phi-
losophy. A good deal of theological perplex-
ity today, and particularly the perplexing
disparity between Barth and Bultmann, is
linguistic in origin and substance, and it
implicitly calls for a "verbal recommenda-
tion" just as urgently as has late British
metaphysics. It is reasonable to expect that
the sharply honed tools of analytical phi-
losophy, their limitations notwithstanding,
can be most useful in the clarification of the-
ological perplexities.
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Conclusion
In Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann
we find two disparate approaches to the
question of Christian language. Barth is con-
cerned to clarify for the church the once-for-
all significance of Jesus of Nazareth. Bult-
mann is concerned to communicate to the
world the abiding relevance of the living
Christ. Barth's language is dominated by the
past, by Jesus of Nazareth. Bultmann's lan-
guage is dominated by the present moment,
by existential faith.
It has been suggested that a solution to
the impasse lies in the "new quest of the
historical Jesus" which affirms that Chris-
tian language must be historical, centered in
Jesus, as Barth has said, but at the same time
existential and contemporary as Bultmann
has maintained.
Perhaps modern analytical philosophy can
aid the theologian as he seeks to resolve the
conflict between Barth and Bultmann. Al-
though analytical philosophy does not claim
so much for itself as it once did, it never-
theless appears prepared to help the church
untangle certain perplexing issues in theol-
ogy by making the church aware of, and by
helping it analyze, the variety of its lan-
guages. It may perhaps show that Barth and
Bultmann are speaking in two different lan-
guages each of which is valid in its own
terms but not valid in its exclusive claims.
The four points of view we have examined
must be reckoned with by contemporary the-
ology. For they raise forcibly the entire is-
sue of the language of the Christian church.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
'Rudolf Bultmann, Presence of Eternity, New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1957, p. 113.
'Ibid., p. 139.
'Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythol-
ogy, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958,
p. 58.
* Cf. Ronald Hepburn, "Demythologizing and the
Problem of Validity," in New Essays in Philo-
sophical Theology, edited by Antony Flew and
Alasdair Maclntyre, New York: Macmillan, 1955,
pp. 227ff.
* Roger Hazelton, New Accents in Contemporary
Theology, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960, p.
49. But Haxelton gives the wrong date; the first
appearance of the quoted passage was in the Ger-
man edition of 1932.
' Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, translated by
G. T. Thomson, New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1949, I, 1, p. 7.
'Ibid., p. 156.
'Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, Zurich:
Evangelischer Verlag, 1948, II, 2, p. 101.
'Ibid., pp. 105, 118.
"Ibid., p. 63.
a
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, translated by
G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight, New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956, I, 2, pp. Iff., 230ff.
a
 Bultmann, op. cit., p. 53.
u
 One must qualify this judgment. Bultmann
himself has been moving toward the position taken
by the so-called "post-Bultmannians." Cf. James
Robinson's A New Quest of the Historical Jesus,
Studies in Biblical Theology No. 24, Naperville,
Illinois: Alex R. Allenson, 1959, pp. 20ff.
uKarl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, Zurich:
Evangelischer Verlag, 1955, IV, 2, pp. lSlff.
" Hermann Diem, Dogmatics, translated by Har-
old Knight, London; Oliver and Boyd, 1959, p. 80.
u
 Robinson, op. cit., pp. 22ff.
" Gunther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nasareth, trans-
lated by Irene and Fraser McCluskey with James
M. Robinson, New York: Harper & Brothers,
1960, pp. 21ff.
"Ibid., pp. 55, 62.
" G. J. Warnock notes that the change is antici-
pated even in the Tractatus Philosophicus in which
Wittgenstein states that in a sense his entire enter-
prise is senseless on the grounds of logical atom-
ism (English Philosophy Since 1900, London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1958, p. 41). See also I. T.
Ramsey, "Contemporary Empiricism," The Chris-
tian Scholar, XIII, 3 (Fall, 1960), 176f., for an
appraisal of Wittgenstein's views of the verifica-
tion principle.
" Cf. J. O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
"John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity," Phi-
losophy and Psycho-Analysis, Oxford: B. H.
Blackwell, 1957, pp. 32, 38.
" Friedrich Waismann, "Language Strata," Logic
and Language, second series, edited by A. G. N.
Flew, Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1955, pp. 22ff.
"W. F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of
Religion, New York-Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1958, from the jacket description. See also his
article, "The Implications of Analytical Philosophy
for Theology," The Journal of Bible and Religion,
XXIX, 3 (July, 1961), 204-210.
* Carl Michalson, "The Ghost of Logical Posi-
tivism," The Christian Scholar, XIIL 3 (Fall,
1960), 223-230.
"From the introduction to Logic and Language,
op. cit., pp. 4f.
